


Trust in E-Voting

Oliver Spycher at Swiss Cyber Storm Bern, 30th October 2018

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E-Voting introduced by Cantons



- CHvote system: developed by GE; AG, BE, BS*, LU, SG and VD have joined.
- Swiss Post solution: FR, NE, TG. GL and GR are planning reintroduction in 2019 respectively 2020.
- These cantons carried out electronic voting trials up to the end of 2015.
- These cantons have not yet carried out any electronic voting trials.
 - *BS will change over to the Swiss Post system (probably in 2019).



Moving ahead step by step

- Trials since 15 years
- Open to 3.8% of the overall electorate (September 2018)
- Security first

Eckdaten zum Einsatz der elektronischen Stimmabgabe am 23. September 2018

Bedingungen	Zugelassenes Elektorat Anzahl Stimmberechtigte (A)			Stimmbeteiligung zugelassenes Elektorat alle Kanäle (B)		Anteil elektronischer Stimmkanal (C)			
Kantone	Inland	Ausland	Total	Anzahl Stimmende	in %	Anzahl Stimmende	in % am zugelassenen Elektorat (A)	in % an allen eingegangenen Stimmen (B)	
Bern	-	17 742	17 742	k.A.*	k.A.*	3 380	19.05	k.A.*	
Luzern	-	4 944	4 944	1 461	29.55	919	18.59	62.90	
Freiburg	1 025	6 040	7 065	2 198	31.11	1 047	14.82	47.63	
Basel-Stadt	37	8 384	8 421	2 304	27.36	1 469	17.44	63.76	
St. Gallen	37 778	8 096	45 874	18 038	39.32	4 377	9.54	24.27	
Aargau	-	9 720	9 720	2 292	23.58	1 448	14.90	63.18	
Thurgau	-	3 649	3 649	1 017	27.87	527	14.44	51.82	
Neuenburg	29 059	566	29 625	k.A.*	k.A.*	4 643	15.67	k.A.*	
Genf	48 171	26 406	74 577	***	***	19 461	26.10	***	
Total	116 070	85 547	201 617	27 310	***	37 271	18.49	***	

www.bk.admin.ch

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People need to trust that...

- Result reflects the voters' intentions
- Secrecy of the vote is respected

→ ...even if they're not an observer

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Trust in Will and Ability





Trust One Trustee

...out of many

O

Trust in Will and Ability



U

E-Voting cannot be trusted...

- Transparency...
 - …inherently impossible
 - ...only towards experts
 - ...eats secrecy
- No meaningful recounts
- And anyhow, administrations will fail



Sure about that?



Trust through verification







Trust through re-verification





















Trust through verification










Trust through re-verification







Summing up votes is verifiable...

...by checking equations







Ja: 2

Nein: 1

Full Verifiability

Voters or observers verify that votes have been

- > cast as intended
- > recorded as cast
- tallied as recorded

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
Cast as intended


		Y.					
N°	Démo Votation populaire fédérale / Demo Eidgenössische Volksabstimmung	Codes de vérification / Prüfcodes					
		Oui / Ja	Non / Nein	Blanc / Leer	Initiative / Initiative	Contre-projet / Gegenentwurf	
1a	Initiative populaire: Acceptez-vous «l'initiative populaire A»?	1299	2023	1610			
	Volksinitiative: Wollen Sie die «Volksinitiative A» annehmen?						
1b	Contre-projet: Acceptez-vous le contreprojet de l'Assemblée fédérale «Contre-projet B»? Gegenentwurf: Wollen Sie den Gegenentwurf der Bundesversammlung «Gegenentwurf B» annehmen?	0027	4701	8186			
1c	Question subsidiaire: Si le peuple et les cantons acceptaient à la fois «l'initiative A» et «le contre-projet B»: Est-ce l'initiative populaire A ou le contre-projet B qui doit entrer en vigueur?			3009	9991	9194	
	Stichfrage: Falls sowohl die «Volksinitiative A» als auch der «Gegenentwurf B» von Volk und Ständen angenommen werden: Soll die Volksinitiative A oder der Gegenentwurf B in Kraft treten?						
2	Acceptez-vous l'arrêté fédéral «C» du 28 février 2017?	5040	7313	0619			
	Wollen Sie den Bundesbeschluss «C» vom 28. Februar 2017 annehmen?						

Taken from the online demo-system by Swiss Post at e-voting.ch


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
Cast as intended







Recorded as cast







Tallying








Tallying





























Bundeskanzlei BK Sektion Politische Rechte
































Can be verified and re-verified By checking equations







Full chain can be verified and re-verified By checking equations





Full chain can be verified and re-verified By checking equations





Full chain can be verified and re-verified By checking equations

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Ordinance of the FCh on E-Voting

Voters or obervers need to be able to detect fraud, assuming that

- 1 out 4 trustees is behaving correctly
- Printing office does not leak codes

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Ordinance of the FCh on E-Voting

- Crypto-Protocol
 - Proof of compliance
 - Audit of proof
- Certification
 - Accredited by Swiss Accreditation Service
 - Software EAL2 / EAL4
 - ISO27001
- Source Code Publication

? Public Intrusion Test

- Decision by Confederation and Cantons
- 1.Q 2019 enabled by Swiss Post
- Pre-Register: https://pit.post.ch/

Tell your friends!

Conclusion

- Verifiability as a foundation of trust
- Required by the FCh ordinance
- Assessed through certification
- Documented towards the public



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